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I. INTRODUCTION: CAPITAL "N" AND LITrLE "N"
Viewed from a broad jurisprudential perspective, Louisiana tort law is an
amalgam of substantive and procedural rules, principles, policies, and practices
that describe and purport to control the activities of citizens, lawyers, trial judges,
and appellate judges. Some of these norms and practices emanate from
legislative sources;' others, from judicial sources; still others, from practicing
lawyers' attitudes, customs, and habits. The interplay of these norms and
practices is detailed, multifarious, and ever-shifting. Thus an article such as this
one-purporting to delineate the allocations of authority among institutional
decision makers in Louisiana tort matters-will necessarily proceed from a
relatively high level of abstraction.
As this article's title indicates, one significant area of Louisiana tort law is
not covered here: intentional torts. I have put intentional torts to the side
principally because we do not usually think of intentional tort cases as regulated
by the duty/risk analysis, which constitutes the skeletal structure of the law of
negligence and (I contend) of strict liability as well.2 It would certainly be
possible to bring intentional tort cases under the duty/risk analysis.3 But a long
. 1. Several aspects of the legislature's role in Louisiana tort law are treated in the co-authored
paper delivered by H. Alston Johnson and David W. Robertson to the 1995 Annual Torts Seminar
of the Louisiana Judicial College, December 15, 1995. That paper was titled "Legislative
'Micromanagement' of Tort Law" and subtitled "Separation of Powers in Present-Day Louisiana:
The Legislative-Judicial Dialogue on the Law of Torts." The matters treated in that paper will not
be covered here. The present paper touches on another aspect of the legislature's role infra part V.E.
2. Act I of the First Extraordinary Session of 1996 drastically curtailed Louisiana strict
liability law, seemingly leaving strict liability in place only for pile driving, dynamite, dogs, and
defective products.
3. Consider the spat-upon umpire's potential lawsuit against Roberto Alomar. The plaintiff's
prima facie case for liability might be analyzed in duty/risk terms somewhat as follows. (I) The duty
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time ago the law formulated crisp definitions for the recurrent intentional torts,
and that set of definitions has worked reasonably well as a mechanism for
determining when to impose liability for intentional torts and for allocating
authority among the jury, trial judge, and appellate court.' Therefore it would
not be a good idea to use the duty/risk vocabulary in intentional tort cases, and
I have gratefully left intentional torts out of this article.
Negligence law is this article's backbone. Discussion of the law of
negligence is facilitated by noting that the term "negligence" has two meanings.
"Negligence" with a capital "N," notionally speaking, designates the field of
liability, as distinct from intentional torts and strict liability. The same term with
a notional lower-case "n" designates the breach (substandard conduct) element
of the plaintiff's prima facie case within the Negligence field.5
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FACTS IN LOUISIANA
A. Introduction
The rules governing judicial review of fact issues are numerous, and their
interrelationships are complex. While their treatment is normally relegated to
treatises and articles on procedure, they need to be included in this article as a
central authority-allocating mechanism that typically functions with particular
drama and controversy in the tort field. In the following subsections I will try
to set forth, summarize, and evaluate the skein of rules and principles ostensibly
limiting the authority of Louisiana trial and appellate judges to review facts.
element would require the trial judge to determine whether the umpire's complaint or petition alleged
the invasion of an Interest protected by law. The question would easily be answered yes. The law
has long protected the interest in freedom from intentional touchings that a reasonable person would
regard as harmful or offensive to a suitable sense of dignity. (2) The breach issue would inquire
whether Alomar intentionally spat in the umpire's face and whether being intentionally spat upon is
offensive to a reasonable sense of dignity. Here, the trial judge would probably conclude that
reasonable minds could not differ in their answers to those questions, so that plaintiff should be
entitled to a directed verdict on the breach issue. (3) The cause infact inquiry would involve tracing
the spittle on the umpire's face to Alomar's actions, again probably resulting in a directed verdict for
the plaintiff on this issue. (4) The legal cause element would address whether the plaintiff's class
of persons and the type of touching suffered fell within the ambit of protection of the rule proscribing
Intentional touches that affront a person's reasonable sense of dignity. Once more, the answer is
undebatably yes. (5) The fifth element of the duty/risk analysis.--damages-is not appropriately
included, because the intentional torts that derive from the writ of trespass-battery, assault, false
imprisonment-do not require the plaintiff to establish that damages were suffered in order to
recover, whereas the law of negligence and strict liability does. (6) Whether Alomar's conduct might
be justified or excused because it was consented to or because the defendant had a privilege to inflict
it would function as tffirmative defenses, which the defendant must plead and prove.
4. For example, the garden variety battery case treated supra note 3 is more economically
treated by asking: Did the defendant intentionally inflict a harmful or offensive touching upon the
person of the plaintiff? Was the touching consented to? Was it privileged?
5. See Leon Green, Judge and Jury 153 n.I (1930).
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Trial judges review facts when they determine whether to grant judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) after a jury trial. Appellate judges review
facts in a variety of procedural and substantive contexts.
Any effective limitation on judicial fact review obviously constitutes a
restriction on judicial authority. Restrictions on judicial authority can usefully
be grouped into two classes: jurisdictional and "prudential. 6 Jurisdictional
constraints on the powers of courts emanate from constitutional or statutory
provisions and are necessarily stoutly maintained. Prudential restraints, on the
other hand, are the courts' own creations. They are designed for a variety of
purposes including saving labor, avoiding the reality or appearance of intruding
into the spheres of the legislative and executive branches of government, and
showing respect for other courts and for juries. Prudential restraints are typically
flexible and subject to relatively ready exception in exigent circumstances.
In Louisiana, all of the limitations on judicial fact review are prudential.
Trial judges' authority to grant JNOV is unfettered by statutory or constitutional
restrictions.! The appellate courts-both the supreme court and the intermediate
courts of appeal-have full constitutional and statutory authority to review facts
as well as law.'
Most experienced practitioners will caution the neophyte to think of
limitations on judicial fact review as restraints on judicial authority as opposed
to judicial power. The caution is wise for at least three reasons. First, each of
the limitations discussed below is flexible in its phrasing and functional
operation, so that a judge avowedly operating subject to a particular limitation
still has a great deal of leeway respecting the degree of aggressiveness to be
employed in reexamining the particular findings of fact at stake. Second, the
very number of rules in play-their near-proliferation--can sometimes seem to
invite courts to choose among them as circumstances seem to warrant. Third,
as indicated above, prudential restraints--created by judges for essentially their
own purposes-by their very nature can readily be modified, supplanted, or even
ignored in exigent circumstances.
If it is correct that judicial fact review is certain to remain flexible and to
some extent result-oriented regardless of the formal prudential standard ostensibly
applicable, then the conceptual apparatus of fact review should be considerably
simpler than it has been allowed to become. There is not much point in judges
and lawyers spending time, energy, and ink mastering and communicating a
6. Robert L. Stem et al., Supreme Court Practice 707 (7th ed. 1993).
7. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1811 details a procedure for handling JNOV motions but does not
address the grounds for granting or denying them.
8. La. Const. art. 5, § 5(C): "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the
jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases extends to both law and facts .. " Id. § 10(B):
"Except as limited to questions of law by this constitution, or as provided by law in the review of
administrative agency determinations, appellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and
facts." La. Code Civ. P. art. 2164: "The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just.
legal, and proper upon the record on appeal .... "
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complicated skein of fact-review principles and rules if the reality is that judicial
power is not significantly constrained by the articulated fact-review principles.
I will now turn to an attempted catalog of the fact-review rules and
principles currently in play in the Louisiana decisions.
B. "Tainted" Findings
The terms "tainted" and "interdicted" refer to findings of fact that resulted
from a mistaken application of legal principle or a biased or prejudiced jury.
Such findings are reviewed de novo.9 Unless otherwise specified, the following
subsections deal with "untainted" findings.
C. Supreme Court Review of Factual Assessments Made by Courts of Appeal
Courts of appeal's factual assessments come before the supreme court in many
different forms, including initial fact-findings at the intermediate appellate level,
de novo fact finding by courts of appeal after determining that the findings below
were manifestly erroneous or were tainted or interdicted by legal error, and
determinations that the trial court's findings should stand because not manifestly
erroneous. While I have not found any source spelling this out, the supreme court's
behavior indicates that in all of these contexts there is no constraint on its review
of the court of appeal's determination, i.e., that the standard of review here is de
novo.
10
Occasionally one finds supreme court language to the effect that both "lower,
courts were manifestly erroneous" in their findings of fact," but such statements
probably should not be regarded as purposeful indications that the supreme court's
review of the courts of appeal's performance is limited by the manifest error rule.
It would be surprising if the supreme court's focus on intermediate appellate fact
assessment was anything other than de novo review. The supreme court has broad
discretion as to which civil cases it chooses to review, and it is the ultimate arbiter
9. Andrus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 1206,1211 (La. 1996); Reichert v. State,
674 So. 2d 1105, 1106 (La. App. 2d Cir.), rev'd and remandedfor manifest error review on concluding
that thefindings were not tainted, 667 So. 2d 542 (1996); Theriot v. Allstate Ins. Co., 625 So. 2d 1337,
1339-44 (La. 1993); Gremillion v. Derks, 684 So. 2d 492. 494 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996); Beoh v.
Watkins, 635 So. 2d 424, 427 (La. App. 4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 640 So. 2d 1325 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Smith v. Audubon Ins. Co., 679 So. 2d 372, 377-78 (La. 1996); Pitre v. Louisiana
Tech University, 673 So. 2d 585, 596 (La.) (Lemmon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 509
(1996); Hill v. Morehouse Parish Police Jury, 666 So. 2d 612,614-15 (La. 1996). Welch v. Winn-Dixie
Louisiana. Inc., 655 So. 2d 309, 316 (La. 1995); Lewis v. State, 654 So. 2d 311, 314-15 (La. 1995):
Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 650 So. 2d 742, 745-46 (La. 1995); Campbell v. Department of
Trans. & Dev., 648 So. 2d 898,902-03 (La. 1995); Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dep't Ambulance
Serv., 639 So. 2d 216. 220 (La. 1994); Byrd v. State, 637 So. 2d 114, 120-23 (La. 1994); Theriot v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 625 So. 2d 1337, 1339-44 (La. 1993); Stobart v. State, 617 So. 2d 880,882 (La. 1993).
11. See, e.g., Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 326 (La. 1994).
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of the array of prudential restraints that determine its behavior in the cases it does
select. It would be hard to understand a desire by such a court to invent fetters
upon its supervision of the appellate courts under its dominion.
D. Appellate Review of Trial Courts' Findings of Fact of the Yes/No Variety
In torts cases some fact questions are not susceptible of a yes or no answer.
For example, courts must assign fault percentages to negligent actors and determine
the amount of damages owed to successful plaintiffs. These kinds of "how much"
findings are treated differently than the more typical "yes or no" fact issues, which
present such questions as whether the defendant's conduct was substandard, 12
whether that conduct was a cause-in-fact of the harm, whether the victim's injuries
were incurred in the wreck or subsequently in the hospital, or which vehicle got to
the intersection first.
When the trial court's "yes or no" findings are not tainted or interdicted by
legal error, the manifest error standard prevails.'" This standard has many
phrasings-some of them unduly elaborate-but the essence of it is that reversal
is appropriate if and only if the appellate court has a definite and firm belief that a
mistake was made.' 4 Once manifest error is found as to a particular matter, the
appellate court proceeds to de novo fact assessment respecting that matter.'5
The formal standard is the same whether the fact finder was judge or jury and
regardless of whether the finding entailed an intuitive appraisal of the credibility of
a live witness or an analysis of documentary evidence. 16 The manifest error rule
is often said to be identical to the "clearly erroneous" standard that governs
appellate review of facts found in federal bench trials.' 7 But a recent dissent by
Justice Kimball is premised on the view that the state manifest error rule allows
more aggressive fact review than the federal bench-trial standard.'
E. Appellate Review of Trial Courts' Percentage-Fault Assignments
The appellate court assesses the trial court's percentage-fault assignments for
manifest error. If a percentage-fault assignment is manifestly too low, the court
12. Whether a finding of no negligence falls under the yes/no category as opposed to the
how/much category is treated infra text and notes 20-22.
13. Lewis, 654 So. 2d at 314; Ferrell, 650 So. 2d at 745-46.
14. See generally David W. Robertson, Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases.
21 La. L. Rev. 402 (1961).
15. Clement v. Frey, 666 So. 2d 607, 609 (La. 1996).
16. Lewis, 654 So. 2d at 314.
17. See, e.g., Ferrell, 650 So. 2d at 745-46. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 articulates the standard:
"Findings of fact [in actions tried without a jury or with an advisory jury], whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
18. Milstead v. Diamond M Offshore, Inc., 676 So. 2d 89, 98 n.2 (La. 1996) (Kimball, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of appeal must raise it, but only to the lowest reasonable percentage. If such an
assignment is manifestly too high, the court of appeal must lower it, but only to
the highest reasonable percentage. 9 A useful term for the described appellate
alteration in percentage-fault assessments might be deferential correction.
It is not entirely clear whether the deferential correction approach is
mandated when the manifestly erroneous finding of the trier of fact was that a
party was not at fault at all.2 The supreme court decision describing and
requiring the deferential correction approach implies that it is confined to "a
'clearly wrong' apportionment of fault," suggesting that manifest error in finding
no fault at all should be followed by a de novo percentage assessment.2 The
fourth circuit has recently assumed the contrary, concluding that the "jury's
failure to find Mr. Jones [the plaintiff in a trip-and-fall case] comparatively
negligent was manifestly erroneous" and that "the lowest percentage of fault a
reasonable factfinder should have allocated to Mr. Jones under these circumstanc-
es was 30 percent."'
F. Appellate Review of Quantum Determinations
The appellate court reviews quantum determinations for abuse of discretion.
If an abuse of discretion is found, the appellate court then performs the
deferential correction operation.2
It is sometimes suggested that different standards of review should obtain for
different types of damages determinations, so that portions of the damages award
"susceptible to mathematical calculation" would be reviewed de novo rather than
under the abuse-of-discretion standard.24 Such an approach may well conduce
to simplification in a particular case. But from the larger perspective of the need
for simplification and clarification of the entire body of scope-of-review rules,
the introduction of yet another rule into this already crowded field should
probably not be greeted with enthusiasm.
19. Clement, 666 So. 2d at 609-11; Davis v. LJ. Earnest, Inc., 631 So. 2d 63, 68 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1994) (finding manifest error in 90% assignment and using the deferential correction rule to
lower it to 75%).
20. The question is this: When the trial court concludes that a party has not been negligent at
all and the court of appeal reverses that finding for manifest error, should the court of appeal then
set what it considers the proper percentage of fault, or should it follow the deferential correction
approach and assign only the lowest reasonable number? I.e., does review of such an issue fall under
this paper's part II.D or under part I1.E? I have not found an answer to that question, but believe that
It should be the former. Part of my thinking is an intuition that zero versus something Is essentially
a yes/no question of a qualitatively different sort from 10% versus 40%. More importantly, my
choice seems slightly simpler than the alternative.
21. Clement, 666 So. 2d at 611 (emphasis added).
22. Jones v. Peyton Place, Inc., 675 So. 2d 754, 762-63 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
23. Andrus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (La. 1996).
24. Kessler v. Southmark Corp., 643 So. 2d 345, 351 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
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G. Trial Court Grant of JNOV in Normal (as Distinct from Bifurcated) Trials
When confronting a motion for JNOV, the trial judge is mandated to assess
the jury's findings under a reasonable minds standard, granting JNOV only if
reasonable minds could not find as the jury has. ' When this assessment yields
the conclusion that the jury findings cannot be sustained, the trial judge is
supposed to make appropriate findings of fact without affording any deference
to the jury's findings.'
This reasonable minds constraint on Louisiana trial judges' authority to grant
JNOV came from federal law,2 7 where it makes sense as an emanation of the
Seventh Amendment. It makes less sense in a system with no constitutional jury
trial guarantee and constitutionally mandated fact review. Indeed, subsection I
below will suggest that the reasonable minds constraint is functionally only
precatory in the Louisiana system. It would make for a more internally
consistent fact-review system if the trial judge's JNOV determination were based
on the manifest error rule rather than the reasonable minds standard.
H. Trial Court Grant of JNOV in Bifurcated Trials with Conflicting Findings
The bifurcated trial-with fact issues against one defendant tried to a jury and
those against another defendant tried to the bench-has been a frequent Louisiana
phenomenon. Such a trial will involve many issues of fact that are common to both
cases. Not surprisingly, juries and trial judges often disagree in their assessment
of such common facts. How can this recurrent problem best be handled?
Courts often say that a "proper" way for the trial judge to deal with the
conflicting jury findings is to grant JNOV.28 If these statements are taken to mean
that the trial judge ought to grant JNOV in any case in which conflicting judge and
jury findings are reached, they clash with the reasonable minds restriction normally
applied to the trial court's decision whether to grant JNOV. (The two views clash
unless one is prepared to say that any jury finding that differs from the trial judge's
on the same point is ipso facto beyond the pale of reasonable minds. Anyone who
25. Anderson v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 583 So. 2d 829. 831-32 (La. 1991); Scott
v. Hospital Service District No. 1, 496 So. 2d 270 (La. 1986).
26. Anderson, 583 So. 2d at 833:
Once a trial court has concluded that a JNOV is warranted because reasonable men could
not differ on the fact that the award was either abusively high or abusively low, it must
then determine what is the proper amount of damages to be awarded. In making this
determination, the judge is not constrained ... to raising (or lowering) the award to the
lowest (or highest) point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that court.
27. Scott, 496 So. 2d at 273: "Because [CCP art. 1811] was based on a federal rule, the
decisions of the federal courts can be used for guidance."
28. Dowden v. Mid State Sand & Gravel Co., 664 So. 2d 643, 647 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995),
writ denied. 666 So. 2d 1099 (1996); Randolph v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1994), writ denied, 651 So. 2d 276 (1995); Ourso v. Grimm, 630 So. 2d 963, 965 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 230 (1994),
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is prepared to say that should be at work reforming our system by getting rid of
civil juries.) The inconsistency is not removed but becomes less significant when
one accepts the demonstration in subsection I below that the reasonable minds
restriction functions as precatory insofar as appellate supervision is concerned.
. Appellate Review of Decisions Involving the Grant or Denial of JNOV
Here, an unduly complex system of appellate review has evolved. I will
first describe it and then propose a functionally equivalent simplification.
Synthesizing the recent jurisprudence on appellate review of decisions
involving JNOV motions" arguably yields the following picture. (1) Ordinarily
the appellate court should conduct a de novo review of the trial judge's decision
to deny or grant a JNOV, simply asking whether the trial judge was right in
concluding that reasonable minds could (or could not) agree with the jury. But
this review seems not to occur in the bifurcated trial/conflicting findings
situation, where the trial judge's grant of JNOV to "reconcile" the conflicting
findings is evidently the recommended procedure. (2) If the trial court correctly
granted JNOV, the judge's substituted findings should then be reviewed under
the manifest error (or for quantum determinations the abuse of discretion)
standard. (3) If the trial judge correctly denied JNOV, the jury's findings should.
then be reviewed under the manifest error/abuse of discretion standard. (4) If the
trial judge was wrong in granting JNOV, the jury's findings should be
"reinstated," and then reviewed under the manifest error/abuse of discretion
standard. (Some judicial language can be found suggesting that in this situation
the jury's findings are "reinstated" and left to stand without further review. The
suggestion is believed to be inadvertent, because on its face it is incompatible
with constitutionally-mandated appellate review of fact.) (5) If the trial judge
erred in denying JNOV, the appellate court should set aside the jury's findings
and then perform a de novo fact review in order to arrive at correct findings.
The complexity of the foregoing description is unfortunate. A great deal of
agreeable simplification would result from eliminating step (1). The appellate
courts should not concern themselves with whether the trial judge correctly
performed the reasonable minds operation. Instead, they should simply apply the
appropriate (usual) standard of appellate review to the findings of fact on which
the judgment below was ultimately based.
Aside from the virtues of simplification, there are two additional arguments
for eliminating step (1). First, unlike the federal restriction on which it was
loosely based, the Louisiana reasonable minds constraint on trial judges'
29. See Anderson, 583 So. 2d at 832-34; Scon, 496 So. 2d at 274; Ventress v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 666 So. 2d 1210, 1217 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995), mod on other grounds, 672 So. 2d 668
(1996); Dowden, 664 So. 2d at 647; Randolph, 646 So. 2d at 1024, 1026; Terro v. Casualty
Reciprocal Exchange, 631 So. 2d 651,653-54 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 157 (1994);
Neal v. Highlands Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992). writ denied. 612 So. 2d 100
(1993); Hutchinson v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 573 So. 2d 1148, 1151 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990).
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authority to grant JNOV has no constitutional or other jurisdictional underpin-
nings. It is purely prudential and was presumably devised as a way of saving
labor at the trial court stage and of signaling judicial respect for the work of
juries. Those purposes are well served when trial judges follow the admonition,
but they do not require the additional safeguard of appellate review.
Second, under the overly complex structure described above, appellate review
of the trial judge's reasonable minds determination is functionally meaningless in
almost all of the situations that can arise. The diagram below is followed by a list
of the theoretically possible situations that might result from an appellate court's
application of the present skein of rules.' Indented immediately beneath each
item in the list is an argument that appellate scrutiny of the reasonable minds
determination should be overtly jettisoned. Following the sense of the indented
arguments will be assisted by recalling that the reasonable minds standard is more
forgiving than the manifest error standard. This means that factual findings might
be manifestly erroneous and still pass (i.e., be sustainable under) the reasonable
minds test,3' and that passing the manifest error test automatically satisfies the
reasonable minds test. The relationship between the two tests is more easily kept
in mind with the help of the following diagram, in which the outermost box
contains the entire universe of findings of fact and each inner box contains the
labeled category plus all other sustainable findings.
reasonable minds could not reach; wrong by
any measure.
reasonable minds could reach; but
manifestly erroneous.
not manifestly erroneous.
corrct by any m
Consider now the theoretically possible outcomes of appellate application of
the present rule-structure:
(a) The trial judge was correct to deny JNOV, because reasonable minds
could agree with the jury. Moreover, the jury's findings were not
manifestly erroneous
30. An application of formal logic would yield eight such possibilities. Only six am set forth
below because one of the formal possibilities (trial judge wrong to deny JNOV, but jury findings not
manifestly erroneous) is a null set and because two others am combined as item (f).
31. The court in Ventress, 666 So. 2d at 1217, gave a careful explanation of how (at least in
legal theory) jury findings that reasonable people could agree with can nevertheless sometimes be
manifestly erroneous.
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The second conclusion completely encompasses the first; the
first step was unnecessary.
(b) The trial judge was correct to deny JNOV, because reasonable
minds could agree with the jury. However, the jury's findings were
manifestly erroneous.
The first step did not affect the outcome; its only conceivable
meaning was symbolic.
(c) The trial judge was correct to grant JNOV, because reasonable
minds could not agree with the jury. The trial judge's post-JNOV
findings were not manifestly erroneous.
Again, the first step serves no purpose; the same outcome
eventuates from going directly to review of the trial judge's
findings.
(d) The trial judge was correct to grant JNOV, because reasonable
minds could not agree with the jury. However, the trial judge's
substitute findings were manifestly erroneous.
Once again, the only determination affecting the outcome is the
second.
(e) The trial judge wrongly denied JNOV, because no reasonable mind
could agree with the jury. This leaves the court of appeal with no
operative fact findings, and necessitates de novo fact finding at the
appellate level.
De novo fact finding at the appellate level also would have
followed from a determination that the jury findings were
manifestly erroneous (which they must have been if no reason-
able mind could have reached them).
(f) The trial judge wrongly granted JNOV, because reasonable minds
could agree with the jury. The trial judge's post-JNOV findings must
therefore be ignored; the jury's findings must be "reinstated" and then
reviewed for manifest error.
Under the proposed simplification, the trial judge's post-JNOV
findings would not be ignored, but would be reviewed for
manifest error. In this situation alone, different outcomes
might eventuate under the proposed simplification as opposed
to the present complex structure.
The refinement at situation (f) does not seem to justify the complexity of the
present structure. A more sensible rule would treat the reasonable minds
restriction as a principle binding on trial judges but irrelevant at the appellate
level. Better yet, the standard applied by the trial judge to the jury findings
should be the manifest error rule. Under either trial-court standard, the appellate
court would simply proceed to review the findings on which the judgment below
was based under the manifest error/abuse of discretion standard.
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J. Appellate Review of Decisions From Bifurcated Trials with Conflicting
Findings
When the trial judge concludes a bifurcated trial by "reconciling" the
conflicting findings through a grant of JNOV, the matter is treated on appeal
under the rules for decisions involving JNOV motions. When such a reconcilia-
tion does not occur, the court of appeal is effectively confronted with two
judgments. Here there is disagreement on the appropriate standard of review.
Authority can be found for each of three propositions: (a) There should be de
novo fact review.' (b) The appellate court should choose the more reasonable
of the conflicting findings.3 (c) The findings that were more properly in the
judge's bailiwick should be reviewed for manifest error (and the judge's other
findings ignored); those that were more properly in the jury's bailiwick should
be reviewed for manifest error' (and the jury's other findings ignored).3"
Here again, the urge for simplification weighs in powerfully. The de novo
response is much simpler than the others.' An additional argument for it is
that the trial judge has cast doubt on the jury's findings by reaching his or her
own conflicting findings, while at the same time not showing enough confidence
in the bench findings to lead on to the JNOV technique. In that situation and
without stretching the point very far, the findings below might be seen to have
been "tainted" by the facial inconsistency.
III. ALLOCATING AUTHORITY AMONG JURY, TRIAL JUDGE, AND APPELLATE
COURT IN NEGLIGENCE CASES: MULTIPLE MODELS
A. Introduction
There can be no hard and fast line between the jury's and the trial judge's
functions, nor between those of the trial and appellate courts. The law of
32. Reichert v. State, 674 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (La. App. 2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 667
So. 2d 542 (1996); Mayo v. Audubon Indemnity Ins. Co., 666 So. 2d 1290, 1292-93 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 671 So. 2d 325 (1996); Beoh v. Watkins, 635 So. 2d 424, 428 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
vacated on other grounds, 640 So. 2d 1325 (1994).
33. Ourso v. Grimm, 630 So. 2d 963, 969 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (Saunders, J., dissenting), writ
denied, 635 So. 2d 230 (1994).
34. Hasha v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 651 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 653
So. 2d 592 (1995).
35. Hasha, 651 So. 2d at 869; Ourso, 630 So. 2d at 969 (Saunders, J., dissenting); American
Casualty Co. v. Illinois Centra] Gulf R. Co., 601 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 604 So.
2d 1005 (1992).
36. Stapleton v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 616 So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 2d Cir.), "approved"
in relevant part, 627 So. 2d 1358, 1362 (1993)-in which the trial judge was wrong to conduct a
bifurcated trial-presented a different situation. There, the trial judge's findings were properly
ignored and the jury's properly subjected to manifest error review.
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negligence (and of the Louisiana versions of strict liability 37) is simply too
multifarious and malleable for that. The fluid nature of tort law's allocation of
decision-making authority is perhaps especially noteworthy in Louisiana, where:
(1) juries are used less frequently than in other states and trial judges often serve
as triers of fact; (2) bench trial findings of fact and jury findings of fact are
treated (at least formally) under identical standards of appellate review; and (3)
appellate fact review is potentially (under the relatively relaxed manifest error
constraint and its cousins) little more restricted than review of questions of law.
However, there are settled practices and traditions that do and should limit
the authority of juries, trial judges, and appellate judges. Moving too far from
those traditions-whether the party favored is plaintiff or defendant-unsettles
lawyers' and citizens' expectations for stable law administration and invites
disrespect for the legal and judicial systems.3" Thus, it would be useful to
describe and validate a traditional model and thereafter to try to insist upon
consistent adherence to it.39
In an effort to begin that task, six models (some of them with variations) for
allocating decision-making authority in negligence cases are set forth in the
following subsections. These models are identical in several crucial respects.
All of them share the widely-accepted viewpoint that the plaintiff's prima facie
case in a negligence-law cause of action is properly treated under a duty/risk
analysis embracing five elements: 4° duty, breach, cause in fact, legal cause,1
and damages. All of the models treat the fault of the victim as an affirmative
defense entailing a separate analysis rather than as a part of the plaintiff's prima
facie case.42 And the models do not differ in their treatment of the cause-in-
fact and damages issues."
37. See supra note 2.
38. Departures from settled traditions, if pronounced enough, may be thought by some
observers to violate constitutional rights. See 65 U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1996) (setting forth
a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. No. 96-452, seeking review of Pitre v.
Louisiana Tech University, 673 So. 2d 585 (La.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 509 (1996)).
39. Here one has modest aspirations. The quintessential plasticity of negligence law counsels
against large ambitions for a neat and unvarying conceptual structure. The unlikelihood of ever
achieving such certainty is suggested by the example of Justice Cardozo, who was quick to absorb a
major part of the legal cause issue into the duty issue in Paisgraf v. Long Island R. 'Co., 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928) (see infra note 68), but strongly opposed the effective absorption of the breach issue into
the duty Issue in Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 54 S. Ct. 580 (1934) (see infra note 75).
40. See David W. Robertson et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 83-84, 136, 160-63 (1989);
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., "Hill v. Lundin & Associates" Revisited: Duty Risked To Death? 10-11
(LSU Law Center 1993); Pitre, 673 So. 2d at 589-90.
41. "Legal cause" is the emerging term-a significant improvement-for what used to be called
"proximate cause." See Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 5 & n.5 (La. 1989). Cf W. Page Keeton
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984).
42. But see infra part V.G.
43. See generally David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 Tex. L. Rev.
(1997) (forthcoming).
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The models do differ in their treatment of the interaction of the duty, breach,
and legal cause elements of the duty/risk analysis." The following presenta-
tions focus only on those elements.45
B. Model One: The Traditional (Keetonian) Model
1. The (Existence of) Duty Issue
The duty element in the five-part formulation of the negligence-law cause
of action has been called an "unnecessary fifth wheel on the coach, incapable of
sound analysis and possibly productive of injustice."'" The duty concept came
into tort law as a more-or-less accidental corollary of the "privity of contract"
doctrine associated with the 1842 English decision in Winterbottom v. Wright, 7
in which the court phrased its conclusion-that an injured coachman had no
action against the entity whose negligent repair of the coach caused it to collapse
while in use--in terms of both the absence of contractual privity between victim
and defendant and the (consequent) absence of a recognizable "duty. 49 "[T]he
formula that (negligence-law] liability followed generally [but only] from harm
caused by breach of a duty of care gained currency only after 1880, stimulated
in part by the theoretical writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr."'49 Leon Green
once called the emergence of the idea that the plaintiff must always establish that
a duty of care was owed "probably the strangest chapter in all tort law."'S
The relationship of the duty issue to the other issues in the five-part formula-
tion of the negligence-law cause of action "is a problem that has produced 'a
vast amount of legal literature' without leading to an agreed scholarly analy-
sis."5t But consensus seems to be emerging that the,
44. Much of the political, ideological, and legal tension generated by the choices among these
models stems from different views as to the usefulness of civil (as opposed to criminal-case) juries. For
that reason the presentations in this section posit the jury as the trier of fact. But the analytical features
of the models do not differ when trial is to the bench. When a bench-trial judge is wearing her trier-of-
fact hat, she is supposed to attend to the same currents of intuition, empathy, and love of democracy that
mythologically elevate the typical jury. See also infra note 66 and infra parts IV and VI.
45. We are here concerned with what are sometimes called "ordinary negligence" cases as
distinguished from cases in which liability is sought to be predicated upon defendant's violation of
a statute. Potts v. Fidelity Fruit & Produce Co., 301 S.E.2d 903. 904 (Ga. App. 1983). But the
models can accommodate statutory violation cases with only slight modification. See infra part V.E.
46. W.W. Buckland, The Duty to Take Care. 51 L.Q. Rev. 637. 639 (1935).
47. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ch. 1842).
48. See Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. IJ. 734 P.2d 1326, 1329 & n.4 (Or. 1987)
(tracing the duty concept to Winterbottom).
49. Id at 1328.
50. Green. supra note 5, at 66.
51. Justice Linde for the Court in Fazzolari, 734 P.2d at 1327 (quoting Justice O'Connell for
the court in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 469 P.2d 783 (Or. 1970)).
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issue of existence of duty, which came into the negligence law in a
somewhat accidental way, is purely formal in the mine run of cases and
presents no significant difficulty. This is because Anglo-American
negligence law firmly incorporates the assumption that anyone engaging
in any activity that has the potential of causing physical harm to others
owes a duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing such harm.52
In England, the courts have been intermittently articulate about the fundamental
principle:
[Wihenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position
with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think
would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in
his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause
danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to
use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.5 3
The Louisiana Supreme Court has more recently written:
The time has come when we can and should say that each person owes
a duty to take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which he can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure a present or future member
of society unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its
exclusion.'
The referenced possibility that there may be some "justification or valid
explanation for [the) exclusion" of a duty of reasonable care signals the existence
of rules of law that protect certain types of defendants from full exposure to
negligence law's normal requirements or that treat certain types of interests as
entitled to lesser protection than is afforded to the interest in protection from
physical harm to one's person and tangible property.
Clarity of analysis in negligence-law cases is greatly furthered if the duty
issue is kept separate from other issues in the case by firmly tying the duty issue
to such categorical rules of law. On the problem of separating the duty issue
from the breach and legal cause issues, I have elsewhere written:
As is often the case with torts puzzles, a view through the prism of trial
court procedure points toward a solution. Careful speakers will reserve
the formulation, "defendant had no duty," for situations controlled by
rules of law of enough breadth and clarity to permit the trial judge in
52. Robertson. supra note 40. at 195 (emphasis in original). See also Fazzolari, 734 P.2d at
1328-29 & n.3.
53. Heaven v. Pender, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509.
54. Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988).
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most cases raising the problem to dismiss the [petition or] complaint or
award summary judgment for defendant on the basis of the rule.5
Keeping the duty issue separated from the others in the suggested manner serves
clarity, an end that is valuable for its own sake. It also helps preserve the
traditional judge/jury allocation in negligence-law cases. When courts begin
phrasing particularistic, fact-sensitive and nuanced no-liability determinations in
"no duty" terms, they "tend[] to turn into an apparent rule of law what may be
only a determination concerning foreseeability in ihe [particular] circumstances
of [the particular] case."'
The foregoing discussion brings us to this summary: affirmative conduce7
producing physical injury58 entails the existence of a duty of reasonable care
unless the defendant enjoys some special categorical protection. By "categorical
protection" is meant a "rule of law of enough breadth and clarity to permit the
trial judge in most cases raising the problem to dismiss the [petition] or award
summary judgment for defendant on the basis of the rule." 9 Examples of such
"no-duty" rules include rules of law limiting landowners' responsibilities for
premises defects,' ° rules of law to the effect that no one has a cause of action
for prenatal injury to an embryo or fetus unless the child survives birth,6
restrictions on recovery for economic loss unaccompanied by physical injury to
person or property,6' and limits on liability for emotional harm.63
55. Robertson, supra note 40, at 161.
56. Fazzolarl, 734 P.2d at 1335.
57. The "affirmative conduct" phrase is necessary to signal the rule that one is ordinarily free
to do nothing, even when acting might help a fellow human being. Anglo-American tort law reflects
the distinction between affirmative conduct and inaction by using the terms misfeasance or
malfeasance to signify affirmative wrongful conduct and nonfeasance to signify a morally
questionable (but normally non-actionable) failure to act. For a no-duty-to-act case, see Mayo v.
Audubon Indem. Ins. Co., 666 So. 2d 1290 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996).
58. Emotional injuries and purely economic injuries involving no physical harm to the
plaintiff's person or tangible property receive a lesser degree of legal protection. See, e.g.. Evans
Vending Service v. Raymond, 666 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writs denied, 667 So. 2d 533,
671 So. 2d 325 (1996).
59. Robertson, supra note 40, at 161.
60. Louisiana no longer limits land occupier liability via the formal limited-duty structure that
grew up around the Invitee-licensee-trespasser categories of victims. Cates v. Beauregard Electric
Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976). But the victim's
defacto status still figures heavily into the courts' assessment of the landowner's responsibility. See,
e.g., Oster v. Department of Transp. and Dev.. 582 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1991); Entrevia v. Hood, 427
So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
61. See Keeton, supra note 41, § 55, at 367-68.
62. See, e.g.. State ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 903, 106 S. Ct. 3271 (1986). The extent to which Louisiana law incorporates such
restrictions Is unclear. See generally 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989); David
W. Robertson, Recovery in Louisiana Tort Law for Intangible Economic Loss: Negligence Actions and
the Tort of Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, 46 La. L. Rev. 737 (1986).
63. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
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Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the trial judge, reviewable de
novo by the appellate court.
2. The Breach (Negligence) (Substandard Conduct) Issue
Determining whether the defendant violated the duty of reasonable care
involves asking whether the seriousness of expectable injury risked by the
defendant's conduct multiplied by the probability of such injury's occurrence
outweighs the burden of taking adequate precautions against it." The inquiry
can be rendered symbolically or quasi-algebraically as B < PL?, with "B"
representing the burden of adequate precautions, "P" the probability of injury,
and "L" the injury. 5 If the plaintiff can show by a preponderance of the
evidence that B < PL, then the defendant's conduct was negligent. The B < PL?
inquiry is made from the ex ante standpoint of a hypothetical person of ordinary
prudence ("POP") (who shares the defendant's superior attributes as well as the
defendant's physical shortcomings but is otherwise objectified) in the shoes of
the defendant. The breach question is for the jury unless reasonable minds could
not differ. The jury's decision may be assisted by evidence as to customary
practices in the defendant's profession, trade, or industry and by expert opinion
testimony, but is ultimately an expression of the jury's normative preferences.6"
64. See Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 234 (La. 1994): Allien v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 202 So. 2d 704, 710-12 (La. App. 3d Cir.). writ denied. 204 So. 2d 574 (La. 1967).
65. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, I., for the
court). The particular factual focus of the B and PL elements of Learned Hand's "formula" depend
upon what the plaintiff's lawyer's has elected to prove. For example, in Grace & Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 168 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Cal. 1958). affd 278 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1960), the defendant's
underground water pipe ruptured and flooded a cargo shed in which plaintiff's property was stored.
The defendant knew that its pipes were old and subject to sudden leaks because the soil in the area
was conducive to corrosion. The shed was on a short branch water line, connected to a pipeline
serving the entire waterfront that might have been several miles long. If the plaintiff's lawyer elected
to confine the attack to the short branch line, the burden of digging up the pipe and checking for
weak spots would probably not have been regarded as prohibitively high, but the probability of a
rupture in that short segment of water line would have been quite low. So the plaintiff's lawyer
elected to show that the probability of a leak somewhere in the entire water line was significantly
high, and lost the bench-tried case because the judge was convinced that the burden of digging up
the entire pipeline was correspondingly (and in the court's view prohibitively) high. The point of
this story is simply to illustrate the intuitively obvious but occasionally neglected requirement that
the same factual focus must be maintained on both sides of the B-PL balance.
66. The application of general norms to particular situations is part of the jury's traditional role.
Issues like the breach element in the negligence-law cause of action are sometimes called "mixed
question[s]" of law and fact. David W. Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions of Fact in
Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 La. L. Rev. 78, 93 (1968) (hereinafter Precedent Value].
Deciding whether an actor's conduct was substandard (negligent) involves both primary fact
finding--determining what the defendant did or failed to do-and norm-applying--assessing whether
a reasonable person would have done better. Thus. "mixed questions" of law and fact can also be
called "particular norm-applying" questions. In the Anglo-American tort system, both primary fact
finding and particular norm-applying have been regarded as business for the trier of fact. See
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3. The Legal Cause (Ambit of Duty) Issue
Whether the plaintiff's class of persons, the type of harm sustained, and the
manner in which the harm came about fell within the scope of protection of the
duty violated by the defendant is typically submitted to the jury under a general
instruction inquiring whether the plaintiffs injury or something similar was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct.67 The
jury gets this question unless reasonable minds could not differ about the answer.
C. Model TWo: The Cardozo Model
Model Two is the same as Model One except that the "class of persons"
portion of the legal cause inquiry is here subsumed under the rubric of duty and
becomes a question of law for the judge6s
D. Model Three: The Green Model
Leon Green urged that all of the inquiries that Model One treats as legal
cause should be subsumed under the rubric of duty and made questions of law
for the judge's determination.'
Precedent Value, at 88 ("tilf a jury and trial judge cannot be trusted to make a decision depending
'entirely upon the question of fact whether the time and distance were sufficient for the engineer to
stop his train and prevent the accident,' it is difficult to see what purposes they could serve") (internal
quotation from Brown v. Louisiana R.R. & Nay. Co.. 147 La. 829, 830, 86 So. 281 (1920))
(emphasis in original).
Res ipsa loquitur does not belong in the illustrative listing of occasional assistance to the jury in
its breach determination. Res ipsa loquitur is a rle of evidence or procedure to the effect that the
mere occurrence of an accident (of a certain type) may generate a permissive inference of negligence
sufficient to take the case to the jury in the absence of adequate exculpatory evidence presented on
behalf of the defendant. In a system treating the res ipsa doctrine sensibly, jurors never hear of it.
67. For example, see Texas Pattern Jury Charge 2.04 (1987), which lumps cause in fact and
legal cause under a broad "proximate cause" rubric as follows: "'Proximate cause' means that cause
which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event
would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must
be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event,
might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event."
68. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that the defendant
owed no duty to an unforeseeable plaintiff); Pitre v, Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1155.
58 (La. 1988) (treating the question of whether the plaintiffs fell within the scope of protection of
defendant's duty as part of the duty issue and the question of whether the type of harm incurred fell
within that scope as the legal cause issue).
69. Dean Green devoted a major portion of his long and vigorous life of scholarship to the
advocacy of his model. See, e.g., the following works: Green, supra note 5; Leon Green, Duties,
Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 42 (1962); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in
Negligence Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 543 (1962); Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61
Colum. L. Rev. 1401 (1961).
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E. Model Four: Holmes and Modem Travel
Aside from a prudent sensitivity to the vagaries of life, nothing stands in the
way of courts' laying down specific rules of conduct to govern recurrent situa-
tions." Such rules become part of the breach issue; it will be useful to term
them breach specifcation. Once they are authoritatively articulated, these rules
alter the trial judge's and jury's approach to the breach issue, which is no longer
determined by general reference to the B, PL and POP conceptions. Instead, it
is determined by testing the actor's conduct against the list of factors.
Model Four consists of Model One with the breach specification technique
substituted for the technique described above at Part IV.B.2. Additional models
could be formulated by engrafting the breach specification technique onto Model
Two and Model Three. For simplicity's sake, we will think of these as hybrids
that might have been named Models Four-A and Four-B.7' These need not be
discussed here, but it is well to realize that we are dealing with a potential
proliferation of approaches.
Model Four shifts authority from the jury to the trial judge, who will not
leave the jury free to make the B < PL? and POP evaluations freely, but will
instead instruct them to apply the factors. It also shifts authority from the trial
court to the appellate court, which will be inclined to use the factors as a
framework for relatively detailed discussion and review of the trial court's
conclusion on the breach issue." But such shifts of authority do not necessarily
afford an independent basis for objecting to Model Four, provided the factors are
not sprung on the trial court after the fact in such a way as to effectively
redecide the entire case at the appellate level.
A principled basis for objecting to Model Four does arise when the breach
specification gets too specific. The nationally"3 famous instance of this mistake
was the United States Supreme Court's decision in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
70. See, e.g., Mathleu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 322-23 (La. 1994) (setting forth
seven factors for determining the reasonableness of police officers' conduct in approaching or
arresting a subject): Watson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967, 974 (La. 1985)
(looking to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act as the source for a six-factor approach to assessing
and comparing the parties' percentages of fault); Giordano v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 643 So. 2d 492, 496
(L App. 3d Cir. 1994) (announcing a rule that in the absence of a gas or electric company's actual
or constructive knowledge of defects in a private wiring or piping system or appliances, the power
company's responsibility for the uses of its product stops at its meter, and using that rule to uphold
summary judgment for the defendant gas company).
71. See also bqfra notes 77 and 80.
72. See Mathieu, 646 So. 2d at 323-26 (using the articulated factors to conclude that the trial
court's conclusion that police officers were negligent was manifestly erroneous). But cf Campbell
v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 648 So. 2d 898 (La. 1995) (reviewing percentage-fault assignments
without mentioning the factors set forth in Watson, 469 So. 2d at 967).
73. Both of the decisions discussed in the text immediately below were decided before Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). Under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
1 (1842), the Supreme Court felt itself empowered to declare nationwide tort rules binding on all
federal courts.
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Goodman, in which Justice Holmes announced for the Court that motorists are
negligent as a matter of law in traversing railroad grade crossings without stopping,
looking, listening, and if necessary getting out of the vehicle to reconnoiter. The
punch line of the Holmes opinion was this:
It is true... that the question of due care very generally is left to the jury.
But we are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is
clear it should be laid down once for all by the Courts.74
Holmes's markedly rustic view of railroad and automobile travel-and his
sense of the proper role of the nation's highest court in laying down detailed motor
vehicle traffic codes-had to be gently overruled less than a decade later in Pokora
v. Wabash R.R. Co., where Justice Cardozo wrote for the Court:
Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are
taken over from the facts of life. To get out of a vehicle and reconnoitre
is an uncommon precaution, as everyday experience informs us. Besides
being uncommon, it is very likely to be futile, and sometimes even
dangerous.... Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for
caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law. The
need is the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of
which the standards have emerged. They are then, not the natural
flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially
developed, and imposed from without.... The opinion in Goodman's
Case has been a source of confusion in the federal courts to the extent that
it imposes a standard for application by the judge, and has had only
wavering support in the courts of the states. We limit it accordingly.
75
From today's vantage point, Cardozo's view seems obviously right and Holmes's
almost ludicrous. Model Four does not work very well unless the breach
specification is wise, modest, and sufficiently flexible to permit the trial judge and
jury to try to provide the individualized justice that tort law purports to afford.
F. Model Five: The Judicial Legislator
The Louisiana Supreme Court has sometimes stated that judges should decide
the breach issue on the basis of broad considerations of "justice and social utility"
viewed "from the same standpoint as would a legislator regulating the matter."76
74. 275 U.S. 66, 70, 48 S. Ct. 24, 25 (1927).
75. 292 U.S. 98, 104-06, 54 S. Ct. 580, 582-83 (1934).
76. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1149 (La. 1983) (recommending the judicial legislator
approach to the breach issue-4he "unreasonable risk" issue--in strict liability cases brought under
La. Civ. Code art. 2317); Oster v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 582 So. 2d 1285, 1288-89 (La.
1991) (indicating that the approach described in Entrevia is also appropriate for the breach issue in
negligence cases). It is interesting to note that the Entrevia opinion found significant support for the
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Model Five consists of Model One with the judicial legislator technique substituted
for the technique described above at Part III.B.2.1"
The context of the Louisiana Supreme Court opinions announcing the
judicial legislator technique has indicated that the envisaged judicial legislator
is the appellate court. But trial judges must also have been meant to follow the
approach, for it would be a very odd system that determined breach by one set
of criteria in the trial court and a different set on appeal. (Under such a
system--with the trial court and the appellate court not even on the same page,
so to speak-no lawyer would have any decent idea of how to try her case, and
the appellate court would inevitably be presented with a record that furnished at
best an incomplete basis on which to perform the judicial legislator operation.)
And presumably trial judges are deemed possessed of the same vision and
wisdom as their appellate colleagues.
All of the foregoing considerations argue strongly for the application of the
judicial legislator technique to determine the breach issue at the trial level in any
case in which the appellate court is going to use that technique to review the
breach issue. Yet the judicial legislator technique contemplates a leisurely
detachment and depth of philosophical study that seem somewhat incompatible
with the daily hubbub associated with trial court work.7s The supreme court
has never explained how a busy trial judge is supposed to find the time to follow
the indicated approach, nor how the approach is meant to work when the trial
judge is sitting with a jury. Nor has the court given any clear expression of the
appropriate standard of appellate review when a trial court has arrived at a
breach or no-breach decision after following the suggested judicio-legislative
path . 9
Judicial legislator approach in the works of the French jurist Geny. 427 So. 2d at 1149. Geny has
frequently been cited by the Louisiana Supreme Court. (A WESTLAW search, LA-CS database (Feb.
24, 1997), indicates citations to Geny in thirteen supreme court opinions since 1980.) In some
circles. Geny's work is associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement and with a radically
open.ended approach to the meaning of words in statutes. William N. Eskridge. Jr. and Philip P.
Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
691. 716 (1987).
77. The approach described here as Model Five, like that described as Model Four (see supra
text accompanying note 71), could also be engrafted onto Model Two or Model Three, but once
again simplicity will be served by merely noting the existence of these additional possibilities
(Models Five-A and Five-B).
It is important to note explicitly that Model Five differs from Model Four in a crucial way. Under
Model Four, the breach specification factors are applied by the trier of fact unless they are unduly
rigid. But Model Five apparently contemplates that the judicial legislator will itself both articulate
and apply the legislative wisdom posited.
78. The approach calls for "considerlation of] the moral, social and economic values as well
as the ideal of justice" and for "study of the law and customs, a balancing of claims and interests,
a weighing of the risk and the gravity of harm, and a consideration of individual and societal rights
and obligations." Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1149.
79. For further treatment of the confusion respecting appellate review of breach determinations,
see infra part V.B.
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G. Model Six: Absorbing the Breach Inquiry into the Duty Issue by Duty
Specification
It is easy enough to phrase a no-breach decision as a no-duty decision. When
that technique, which I will term duty specification, is engrafted onto Model One,
the result is Model Six.so The duty specification technique can be illustrated by
a hypothetical case in which the victim has been electrocuted through coming into
contact with an electric company's uninsulated high-voltage line. A judge who
believes that the company's responsibility under the circumstances was satisfied by
positioning the wire a suitable distance above the ground might say "the defendant
had no duty to insulate the wire" as readily as she might say "under the circum-
stances the defendant's duty of reasonable care was not violated by the absence of
insulation." Each form of words effectively communicates the judge's conclusion.
However, the second formulation-putting the result in terms of the breach
issue-is a more accurate reflection of thenormal judge-jury allocation in cases of
this kind. The power company enjoys no categorical protection from responsibility
for its wires; its responsibility depends upon the kind of nuanced case-by-case
inquiry that is at the heart of the breach issue. From that point of view, when a
judge articulates such a conclusion in no-duty terms, she has engaged in a shift
away from the traditional practice."
Courts in Louisiana occasionally indulge in the indicated shift, effectively
bringing the breach issue into the realm of duty and thereby removing it from the
80. The approach described here as Model Six, like Models Four and Five above, could be
engrafted onto any of the first three models. See supra notes 71 and 77. Again, we Will not pause
to discuss all of the hybrids, except to note in passing that the model that would result from
engrafting Model Six onto Model Three (Model Six-B) would radically reduce the jury's traditional
role, leaving no work for the jury except primary fact-finding and determining the cause in fact and
damages issues.
81. Robertson, supra note 40, at 161-63, states that the instanced "duty" articulation "should
be avoided" and goes on to explain: "[In] Clinton v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 36 lll.App.3d 1064,
344 N.E.2d 509 (1976), ... (pilaintiff's son came into contact with an uninsulated high-voltage
power line that defendant (the power company) maintained above the plaintiff's property. The trial
judge directed a verdict for defendant on concluding that plaintiff failed to prove maintaining an
uninsulated line was unreasonable under the circumstances shown. This was clearly a no-negligence,
rather than a no-duty, determination. But directed verdicts on the negligence issue, while by no
means rare, are not routine. Perhaps for that reason, in affirming the trial judge's disposition the
nllnois appellate court presented the issue as one of duty. First referring to the well-settled
proposition that 'the determination of the existence of a legal duty is a question of law,' the court
then stated that the question in the case at hand was whether 'defendants had a legal duty to insulate
the wire over the Clintons' property.' Expressing the problem in the case as a duty issue made it
seem more or less automatically a question for the judge to answer, with no role for the jury.
Whereas, had the court said that the issue was whether it was less than reasonable care under the
circumstances for defendant to maintain an uninsulated line, that formulation would have tended to
make the question seem to be one for the jury to answer. None of this suggests that the Clinton
result was wrong; but the court's use of a duty label for a negligence issue made the result seem
foreordained, whereas in reality it was a very close case." See also supra text accompanying note
56.
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bailiwick of the trier of fact."2 The leading example is probably Pitre v. Louisiana
Tech University.3 A residential student at Tech was hurt in a sledding accident
on an icy campus hill when he collided with a parking lot light pole. The trial judge
held that the defendant owed no duty to the young man and did not reach any of the
other issues. Reversing, the court of appeal concluded that the university owed a
duty of reasonable care to its residential students and then proceeded to determine
the breach, cause in fact, and legal cause issues in the plaintiff's favor." In an
opinion by Justice Victory, the supreme court reversed the court of appeal, using
the B < PL? inquiry as a basis for concluding that "Tech had no duty under the facts
of this case.""U As indicated above, the B < PL? inquiry is at the heart of the
breach determination and has not traditionally been used to discuss existence-of-
duty issues." Concurring, Justice Lemmon (joined by Justice Kimball) noted this
unusual feature of the majority opinion and concluded that the proper explanation
of the result in Pitre was no-breach rather than no-duty:
Here, the defendant had a duty to act reasonably in view of the foreseeable
risks of danger to students resulting from the winter storm. As noted by
the majority, the defendant did act reasonably under the circumstances."
Neither segment of the Pitre court indicated that the manifest error rule had
any role to play. For Justice Victory, the issue was duty, a legal issue reviewable
de novo. For Justice Lemmon, the issue was breach, a fact issue; but the Lemmon
concurring opinion evidently rests on the view that when the supreme court reviews
fact assessments made by courts of appeal, as distinguished from trial courts, the
appropriate standard of review is de novo rather than manifest error."
82. See, e.g.. Donaldson v. Sanders, 661 So. 2d 1010. 1014 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995), writ
granted, 668 So. 2d 363 (1996). in which the Third Circuit phrased the question of whether a nurse
had been negligent in failing to inform the treating physician of the patient's condition as whether
she "was required to contact [the] treating physician" and termed that question "a legal issue" and
"a question of law."
83. 673 So. 2d 585 (La.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 509 (1996).
84. *Id
85. Pitre, 673 So. 2d at 590-93. The Pitre court broke the B (burden of precautions) ingredient
out into "the intended benefit of the thing" and "the cost of prevention". it called the PL (probability
X loss) ingredient "potential for harm." Id. at 590. This phrasing is but one of many prevalent
versions of the B < PL? vocabulary. See, e.g., Allien v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 202 So. 2d
704. 710-12 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 251 La. 392. 204 So. 2d 574 (1967). The semantical
differences are of no moment; in all versions the threat posed by the harm-producing activity or thing
is weighed against the costs of giving up the activity or thing or of correcting its dangerous aspects,
whichever is cheaper. The vocabulary of "costs" and "cheaper" should not permitted to obscure the
essentially unquantifiable nature of the B < PL? inquiry. It is risk-utility evaluation of a meditative
and discursive kind, not mathematics.
86. See supra part III.B.2.
87. Pitre. 673 So. 2d at 596.
88. See supra part II.C. An alternative explanation of Justice Lemmon's omission of any
manifest error discussion is suggested infra note 102.
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H. Summary and Conclusion
The first three models have strong and deep jurisprudential support." Model
Four has a thinner but arguably respectable pedigree. At least until relatively
recently, the authorities favoring or exemplifying the fifth and sixth models have
been comparatively scattered. These observations do not mean that the fifth and
sixth models are necessarily inferior to the first four. But in the next section I will
offer arguments that Model One is preferable to any of the others.
I will also argue that it is important for the courts to select a single model and
then try to stick to it.90 This is my principal point: it is probably more important
for the courts to demonstrate consistency in their analytical approach than it is for
them to select the "right" approach. We can have a reasoned debate about which
approach to select, but there is very little to be said for vacillating among the
models to the extent that lawyers are significantly uncertain as to how to try their
cases.
9 1
IV. CHOOSING AMONG THE MODELS: THE CASE FOR MODEL ONE
Widely differing perspectives on the appropriate conceptual structure for
negligence and strict liability cases are likely to be found among the various
participants and observers of the process. Observers and participants-including
legislators, appellate judges, trial judges, practicing lawyers, litigants, academi-
cians, and informed citizens-will vary in their ideological and political views and
in their preferences for theoretical as opposed to practical vantage points.
Moreover, for each observer, perspectives and preferences are likely to vary
significantly from decade to decade as social, economic, and political changes bring
unexpectedly differing pressures to bear on the litigation process. Plainly no single
voice will be very significant. On matters as subtle and complex and those under
consideration in this article, progress comes (if it does come) from the gradual
accretion of tradition--curbed and culled by a kind of Darwinian mechanism
89. See infra note 93.
90. But see supra note 39.
91. Not so long ago a highly-regarded British jurist seemed to despair of achieving consistency
respecting negligence law's conceptual structure. Addressing in particular the difficulties of
distinguishing between the duty and legal causation issues, Lord Denhing wrote as follows: "The
more I think about these cases, the more difficult I find it to put each into its proper pigeon hole.
Sometimes I say: 'There was no duty.' In others I say: 'The damage was too remote (i.e., the
defendant's conduct was not a legal cause of the injury].' So much so that I think the time has come
to discard these tests which proved so elusive. It seems to me better to consider the particular
relationship in hand, and see whether or not, as a matter of policy, [the loss sued for] should be
recoverable, or not." Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd. v. Martin and Co. (Contractors) Ltd.. [1973 1
Q.B. 27, 37. Such conceptual nihilism might be acceptable in a unified bench-trial system like
England's, but would be wholly unacceptable in any American jurisdiction. See David W. Robertson,
Liability in Negl18ence for Nervous Shock, 57 Modem L. Rev. 649, 650-52 (1994).
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whereby undue novelty is quickly repudiated and whereby undue partisanship and
undue complexity cannot long survive-moving toward working consensus.
Despite the great obstacles to the search for consensus and the likelihood of
continuing ferment and disagreement, it might be possible to come to some
provisional agreement on the criteria that an approach or model for deciding
negligence and strict liability cases ought to satisfy. Perhaps a useful perspective
from which to conduct that discussion would be that of a lawyer-litigator with no
particular axe to grind who is also a conscientious citizen with an interest in further-
ing the efficient and responsive workings of the judicial branch. From that point
of view, it would seem that tort courts ought to want an approach meeting the
following criteria. It will be convenient in the ensuing discussion to refer to these
criteria by the indicated (italicized) short-hand designations.
(1) Flexibility. The selected model should be sufficiently flexible to enable
trial and appellate judges to strive to do justice between the parties without feeling
straight-jacketed.
(2) Firmness. At the same time, it should be sufficiently firm to engender
confidence in law administration and predictability of outcome in recurrent
situations.
(3) Respect. The selected model should afford decent respect to the trier of
fact.
(4) Judicial Wisdom. At the same time, it should not cede broad policy-making
authority to the trier of fact.
(5) Labor-Saving. The selected model should neither require nor permit
appellate courts to rethink everything that happened in the trial court. We should
avoid having to do everything twice and some things three or four times.
If only because they are very general and abstract, the foregoing criteria should
be relatively uncontroversial. They furnish arguments for rejecting several of the
models presented above in Part 11.
Model Six (duty specification) excellently serves the flexibility and judicial
wisdom criteria but seems to fail the others. Model Six arguably fails thefirmness
criterion because it seems to come into play at the appellate level only now and
again, giving the lawyers who tried the case no realistic way to anticipate the shift
and deal with it in their trial-court presentations. It seems to fail the respect
criterion because the trier of fact's breach determination somewhat unaccountably
turns into a duty determination and comes in for de novo review. And it runs into
trouble with the labor saving criterion to the extent that it requires the appellate
court to start from scratch in evaluating the defendant's conduct.
For similar reasons, Model Five also satisfies the flexibility and judicial
wisdom criteria but seems to struggle against all of the others.92 Model Four
92. Model Five fails the firmness test for two reasons. First, courts move into the "legislative"
mode unpredictably; and lower courts use it far less often than the supreme court, lending a further
asymmetry and consequent unpredictability to the process. Second, the factors that the judicial
legislator is supposed to resort to are so vague and general that reasoned discourse can almost always
generate multiple outcomes. Model Five may fail the respect test because its logic invites the
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arguably satisfies all of the criteria except the first, but at least in its extreme
(Holmesian) version it exemplifies such rigidity as to constitute an outright insult
to the flexibility criterion.
Choosing among the remaining models, Models One through Three, is not
easily done. All of these approaches seem to satisfy the five criteria posited above,
perhaps helping to explain why the Louisiana courts have vacillated among
them.93 Such vacillations are perhaps unavoidable. But too much high-visibility
variation creates the danger of giving the informed public an unfortunate
impression: either that justice is occasionally administered on an ad hoc or ex post
facto basis, or that the judiciary's conceptual apparatus is in disarray. If possible,
a single model should be chosen and adhered to.
I argue that Model One is best," and advance three interrelated arguments in
support of this position. (a) Model One gives more authority to the trier of fact than
the others. This is a virtue for those who believe that fact-finding and specific
norm-applying95 should be done by decision makers close to the human beings
involved and close to the basic ground of the events giving rise to the litigation, as
distinct from decision makers functioning at a time and place remote from the
original events and insulated from contact with the actual human beings whose
well-being is at stake. This preference might be described as one for "warm" or
"empathetic" fact-finding and norm-applying as opposed to reflective, relatively
abstracted or detached, and perhaps more philosophical and scholarly fact-finding
and norm-applying. (b) By giving more authority to the trier of fact (whether judge
or jury), Model One distributes power nearer to the people* and thus incorporates
a pro-democracy bias. (c) Model One gives less work to the appellate courts than
any of the others, thereby potentially reducing the number of appeals and enabling
the appellate courts to concentrate their abilities and energies on the broader legal,
economic, and social implications of the cases brought to them.
appellate court to ignore the trier of fact's breach determination and absorb that issue into a broad
legislative inquiry that is treated as a matter of law. Model Five will offend the labor saving
criterion to the extent that the appellate court essentially starts from scratch in determining the breach
issue under the judicial legislator approach.
93. The vacillation is discussed and documented in Freeman v. Julia Place Ltd. Partners, 663 So.
2d 515, 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995). writ denied, 666 So. 2d 680 (1996). It is also mentioned in
Kenney v. Cox, 652 So. 2d 992 (La. 1995) (Dennis, J., concurring). Louisiana Supreme Court authority
for Model One includes Wilson v. Department of Public Safety. 576 So. 2d 490,493 (La. 1991), Fowler
v. Roberts. 556 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (La. 1989), atfd on reh'g. 556 So. 2d 13 (La. 1990), and Roberts v. Benoit,
605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991), rev'd in part on reh'g, 605 So. 2d 1050, 1064 (La. 1992) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting). For other support for Model One, see White v. City of Baker, 676 So. 2d 121, 125 (La. App.
I st Cir.), writ denied, 679 So. 2d 1351 (1996); Retif v. Doe, 632 So. 2d 405, 407-08 (La. App. 4th Cir.).
writ denied, 638 So. 2d 1095 (1994); Jefferson v. Costanza, 628 So. 2d 1158, 1161-62 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1993). Authority for Model Two includes Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So. 2d 1151, 1155-
58 (La. 1988). Authority for Model Three includes Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 233 (La. 1994).
94. In my view Model One can usefully be combined with a careful version of Model Four
whereby wise and suitably flexible factors for determining the breach issue in particular recurrent
factual contexts are specified and used in a consistent and principled way.
95. See supra note 66.
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As stated at the beginning of this section, different observers will differ as to
how much authority should reside with the trier of fact. My own belief that triers
of fact should have more authority than Models Five and Six afford them is not
generated by love or reverence for juries; at bottom it is rather a simple preference
for leaving greater authority at the trial-court level. A detailed accounting for this
preference would amount to a civics treatise that has no place here. Instead, let me
close this section by invoking Dean Green:
The trial judge [should be] the most important officer of government.
There is no statesmanship so valuable as that of the trial judge who has the
capacity for doing business without making that an end in itself.
Nevertheless, our court systems tend more and more to magnify the
appellate judge and to belittle the trial judge.... [Such a shift of power]
is not an unnatural development in any hierarchy.... It may be an
inevitable product of the American genius for organization and the
concentration of power. Whatever its ultimate explanation, the shift of
power from the trial court and jury to the appellate court-from the local
community to a centralized court system-may well deaden the adminis-
tration of the law, just as... other concentrations of power have produced
conformity in other facets of our lives.96
A homelier version of Dean Green's eloquence would simply urge that appellate
courts should respect the trialjudge's superior vantage point forparticularizing the
general norms that constitute our law. A last word from Dean Green: "In the trial
court the case is pulsing with life; by, the time it reaches the appellate court, much
of its life has leaked out or evaporated."97
V. SELECTED DIFIIcuLTIEs wrm THE APPLICATION AND OPERATION OF THE
DUTY/RISK ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
From the viewpoint expressed in Parts III and IV above, courts' departures
from Model One, and particularly their occasional preference for Model Five or
Model Six, constitute perhaps the most significant set of current difficulties with
applying and operating the duty/risk analysis. Some of the matters treated in the
following subsections could have been formulated as debatable departures from
Model One. Others exemplify analytical problems of a different sort. They are
96. The quoted statements of Dean Green come from Green, supra note 5. at 81-82, and from
Leon Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 Yale L.J. 482, 487 (1956). The immediate source
of the quotation is David W. Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 393,
432-33 (1978) [hereinafter Green's Philosophyl. The first half of Green's Philosophy summarizes
Dean Green's career and legal philosophy. The second half constructs a series of philosophical and
judicial-reform essays using Dean Green's words as a kind of montage/homage.
97. Green, supra note 96, at 486.
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grouped in this section without regard to their amenability to treatment under the
model-selection heuristic device because they are current, controversial, and
susceptible of being intelligently debated regardless of the contending analysts'
preferences for an authority-allocating model.
B. Appellate Review of Breach Determinations: A "Surfeit of Authorities"?0'
Evidently beginning with Green v. City of Thibodaux," several intermediate
appellate decisions have held or stated that a trial court's determination that
particular conduct was or was not negligent--or that a particular condition of a
thing did or did not present an unreasonable risk of harm-should be reviewed de
novo rather than taking the protection of the manifest error rule.'tu These courts
have given three arguments on behalf of this new view: (a) that uniform results are
desirable and cannot be achieved without full appellate review; (b) that trial courts
have no particular advantage in applying generalized norms to particular situations;
and (c) that on the face of things, the judicial legislator approach to the breach issue
is lawmaking and not fact finding, such that only de novo review is appropri-
ate.'
0
The Green position is still a minority viewpoint and in my opinion ought not
to prevail in the marketplace of law-administration ideas. 2 None of the three
reasons the courts have ventured for the new position is convincing. (a) The hope
for uniform results-rules--deeming particular acts, omissions, or things substan-
98. Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes, [ 1959) A.C. 743,758 (Lord Somervell, stating that
turning common-sense propositions of fact-e.g., that a particular worker was negligent in not availing
himself of readily-available protective equipment-into propositions of law and hence into precedents
would, unless checked, soon cause the "precedent system [to] die from a surfeit of authorities").
99. 671 So. 2d 399, 403 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writ denied, 668 So. 2d 366 (1996).
100. Cases or judges following Green include (in chronological order) Phipps v. Amtrak, 666 So.
2d 341, 343-44 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1995). writ denied, 668 So. 2d 368 (1996); Tullis v. Rapides Parish
Police Jury, 670 So. 2d 245. 250 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ not considered, not timely filed, 670 So. 2d
1241 (1996) (Thibodaux. J., concurring); Miller v. State, 679 So. 2d 134, 140 (La. App. 3d Cir.). writ
denied, 680 So. 2d 650 (1996) (Thibodaux, J., dissenting); Dixon v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets,
Inc., 673 So. 2d 696,697 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1996); Migues v. City of Lake Charles, 96-626, 1996 WL
638203, ** 2-3 (La. App. 3d Cir. Nov. 11, 1996). But see Hathaway v. Jeep Corp., 679 So. 2d 913,916
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 684 So. 2d 926 (1996) (refusing to follow Green and citing Hines v.
Remington Arms Co., 648 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. 1994), to show that Green was wrong).
101. The first two reasons are set forth in Chief Judge Lottinger's opinion for the court in Green,
671 So. 2d at 403. The third is found in Judge Gonzales's opinion for the court in Phipps, 666 So.
2d at 344.
102. In Boyle v. Board of Supervisors, 685 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (La. 1997). the court declined to
endorse or reject Green. Some might argue that the Green position was foreshadowed in the
concurring opinions of Justices Ortigue (joined by Kimball) and Lemmon in Ambrose v. New
Orleans Police Dep't Ambulance Serv., 639 So. 2d 216, 223.24 (La. 1994). These concurrences
posited that the question of whether there is sufficient evidence to reach the jury on the breach issue
Is a question of law; they might (but in my view should not) be read to suggest that the breach issue
itself-the norm-applicition portion-is also a question of law.
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dard vel non seems a modem echo of Justice Holmes's ill-fated Goodman
decision."° Such rules are fraught with the risk of undue rigidity, and many of
them would soon prove wrong. It bears emphasis that de novo review of an issue
entails labeling the issue one of law, and that labeling the issue one of law entails
the necessity of future courts' honoring the issue's resolution as a binding
precedent. 1  Why should a court of appeal want to bind future courts to the view
that an inch-and-a-half depression in a sidewalk or curb does not constitute a
defect?'s A body of jurisprudence incorporating such binding propositions
would soon choke on "a surfeit of authorities. ''tt (b) I think the trial court does
have a superior vantage point for making the kind of nuanced and situation-
sensitive determination epitomized by the breach issue. If we might have Green on
Green: "In the trial court the case is pulsing with life; by the time it reaches the
appellate court, much of its life has leaked out or evaporated."'0' (c) As argued
above,tas the judicial legislator approach is itself something of an anomaly and
ought not be permitted to generate such powerful implications.
Moreover, I would offer two further arguments against the Green v. City of
Thibodaux rule.'m First, the law seems settled that in jury-tried cases the
unreasonable risk issue-whether in negligence or strict liability actions-is for the
jury unless reasonable minds could not differ."0 Adoption of the Green rule
would require either that that practice be changed-a change for which no reasons
have been offered-or that appellate courts review jury determinations de novo, a
practice that would entail both internal inconsistency within the legal system and
a symbolic disrespect for the institution of the jury and the citizens who serve that
institution.
Second, the breach issue is typically the most hotly contested and vigorously
tried issue in a tort case. This is especially true in strict liability actions (products
liability and liability under the former article 2317 regime).' If the trier of fact's
decision on that issue is to be reviewed de novo, it is difficult to see why we should
not have de novo review on the cause in fact, legal cause, and existence-of-
compensable-damages issues as well. And if we are to have de novo review on all
103. See supra part III.E.
104. Cf Robertson, supra note 66..
105. See Green, 671 So. 2d at 401 ("the difference in level between the sidewalk and the curb
was no greater than an inch and a half at its worst point"); id. at 403 ("ltil require that this particular
curb be maintained to a standard sufficient to protect this pedestrian ... would place too great a
burden upon the City.... The trial judge's determination that the curb in question posed an
unreasonable risk of harm... was legally wrong.").
106. Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes, [19591 A.C. 743, 758. See supra note 98.
107. Green, supra note 96, at 486.
108. See supra part U..
109. My arguments may be viewed as an elaboration of Judge Shortess's dissent in Green, 671
So. 2d at 404.
110. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Acadiana Fast Foods. 670 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied.
671 So. 2d 920 (1996).
111. See supra note 2.
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of these issues, it becomes hard to understand why we should have trials at all. It
would seem more consonant with the Green view-at least when that view is
carried to its logical implications--to dispense with trials as such and merely hold
hearings at which the erstwhile trial judge (or some other ministerial arm of the
appellate court) would preside over the formation of a record on the basis of which
the appellate court would then pronounce its judgment. Any overt proposal for
such a system would be quickly rejected as radically novel. Yet Green seems to me
to point strongly in that direction.
C. Application of the Duty/Risk Analysis to Strict Liability Cases"'
I have found no overt discussion of whether the duty/risk analysis applies to
strict liability cases. A large number of authorities can be found implying that it
does apply." 3 Perhaps a significant number could be found implying that it does
not apply."" The affirmative side has the better of this silent debate. The only
significant difference between a strict liability case and a negligence case is the
makeup and articulation of the breach issue. The other issues are identical as
between strict liability and negligence, and the duty/risk analysis is a useful and
time-tested way of keeping them separated and keeping them straight.
D. Treating Intentional Tort Cases as Though They Involved Only Negligence
A standard definition of negligence is conduct that is unacceptable because it
creates an unreasonably high risk of harm. Virtually all intentional torts fall
comfortably under that broad conceptual umbrella.
Plaintiffs' counsel sometimes have an incentive to pursue intentional torts
under the rubric of negligence. This incentive is present when the tortfeasor's
liability insurance carrier disavows coverage of intentional torts"' and (in some
systems) because of particularities of immunity provisions" 6 and statutes of
112. Id
113. See, e.8.. Rhodes v. State, 674 So. 2d 239,242 (La. 1996); Farley v. State, 680 So. 2d 746 (La.
App. I st Cir. 1996); Graves v. Page, 95-1571, 1996 WL 426563, * 3 (La. App. 3d Cir. Aug. 31, 1996):
SummerviHe v. Louisiana Nursery Outlet, Inc., 676 So. 2d 238, 240 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1996); Jones v.
Peyton Place. Inc.. 675 So. 2d 754, 761 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996); Millet v. Cormier, 671 So. 2d 1101.
1106 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 673 So. 2d 1036 (1996); Buchert v. State, 669 So. 2d 527.528-29
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 671 So. 2d 341 (1996); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.. Strict Liability in
Action: The Truncated Learned Hand Formula, 52 La. L. Rev. 323, 328.30 (1991).
114. See, e.8., Teel v. State, 681 So. 2d 340, 343-44 (La. 1996).
115. See David W. Robertson. Recurrent Problems Involving Intentional Torts. paper presented
to Louisiana Judicial College November 1994.
116. See, e.g., Moos v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 275 (D. Minn. 1954), affd, 225 F.2d 705(8th
Cir. 1955) (holding that a VA hospital's mistake in amputating the wrong leg of a patient was a technical
battery and hence not actionable given the Federal Tort Claims Act's retention of governmental
immunity for "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994)).
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limitations.' Whether the tactic of labeling a claim that is "naturally" an
intentional tort claim as negligence can succeed in avoiding the perceived difficulty
(presented by the fact that the alleged tort is also an intentional one) depends upon
the meaning and purpose of the particular intentional-tort limitation at stake. This
paper does not address these issues.
The concern here is not with deliberate efforts by counsel to treat intentional
torts as negligence, but with occasional cases in which the plaintiffs presentation
of the intentional tort case under the rubric of negligence seems inexplicable and
thus perhaps inadvertent. In Mathleu v. Imperial Toy Corporation, the Louisiana
Supreme Court recently decided an intentional shooting case under a negligence-
law analysis and without mentioning that intentional shootings, however justified
they may turn out to have been, are batteries."' Presumably the court accepted
the parties' characterization of the case as suitable for disposition under the
framework of negligence law and without reference to any light that the law of
intentional torts might have shed.
Similar instances can be found throughout the jurisprudence." 9 It does not
appear that Mathieu or any of the other cases would have necessarily turned out any
differently under an intentional tort analysis. But intentional tort doctrine often
provides a sharper and more controlled focus on both tortfeasor fault and victim
fault than the (by comparison) more discursive apparatus of negligence law.
Particularly now that it has been made clear that percentage-fault reduction of the
victim's recovery is not appropriate in cases against intentional tortfeasors, n°
courts should arguably be more vigilant to treat intentional torts as such, despite
counsel's failure to refer to the appropriate doctrinal apparatus.
E. The Effect of Violating a Statute
At one time Louisiana had a garden-variety negligence per se doctrine'
whereby a defendant's violation of a traffic or similar statute designed to protect the
117. See, e.g., Ghassemieh v. Schafer. 447 A.2d 84 (Md. App. 1982) (allowing a claim against
a thirteen-year-old student for injuries caused by pulling a chair from beneath a teacher to be brought
as a negligence claim--covered by a three-year statute of limitations-despite the fact that the one-
year statute of limitations on battery had expired).
S18. 646 So. 2d 318 (La. 1994). Saying that shootings are batteries does not mean that shooters
will always be liable. The shooter may have a consent or privilege defense. See supra notes 3 and 4.
119. See, e.g., Dundas v. Real Superstore. 650 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 3d Cir.). writ denied, 653
So. 2d 590 (1995) (transferred-intent assault or battery); Corley v. Delaney, 629 So. 2d 1255 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 156 (1994); Clement v. Armoniet, 527 So. 2d 1004 (La.
App. 5th Cir:), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 475 (1988). Cf Meany v, Meany, 639 So. 2d 229 (La. 1994)
(technical battery?); Smith v. Trattler, 96-225, 1996 Wi. 525853 (La. App. 5th Cir. Sept. 18, 1996)
(intentional or reckless infliction of severe emotional distress?).
120. Under Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assoc., Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712 (La. 1994), some
intentional tort victims could have percentage-fault assessed against them. As amended by Act 3 of
the First Extraordinary Session of 1996, the Civil Code now seems to preclude docking the
Intentional-tort plaintiff for his or her percentage fault. La. Civ. Code art. 2323(C).
121. The seminal negligence per se case In the United States is Martin v. Herzog. 126 N.E. 814
(N.Y. 1920) (opinion for the court by Cardozo, J.).
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plaintiff's class of persons against the general type of harm suffered by the
plaintifft 2 would count as "negligence per se" to supply the element of breach
without the need for any reference to the normal B < PL? inquiry.23 But
nowadays the rule is said to be as follows:
The doctrine of negligence per se has been rejected in Louisiana.
However, statutory violations provide guidelines for civil liability.12
Using statutes as "guidelines," courts seem almost always to conclude that
breaching the statute is equivalent to breaching the duty of reasonable care. But
"guidelines" is a less firm and predictable approach than negligence per se. So the
questions arise: when, how, and why was the doctrine of negligence per se
"rejected"?
The "rejection" characterization most recently appeared in Galloway v. State,
in which the supreme court proceeded in typical fashion by first stating that
negligence per se is gone and then going on to impose liability on the basis of the
statutory violation.'2 The "rejection" view can be traced (moving in inverse
chronological order) to Faucheux v. Terrebonne Consolidated Gov't126 Boyer v.
Johnson,'" Weber v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 8 and Laird v. Travelers Ins.
122. The negligence per se doctrine addresses statutes that prohibit or prescribe particular
conduct but that do not themselves make any provision for tort consequences. Under this doctrine,
courts in tort cases can and should use such statutes as a means of specifying the standard of care
owed by the defendant, provided the statute was designed to protect the general class of persons to
which the plaintiff belongs against the general type of harm sustained. Gorris v. Scott, (1874] 9 Ex.
125; Potts v. Fidelity Fruit & Produce Co., 301 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. App. 1983).
123. Eubanks v. Brasseal, 310 So. 2d 550, 553 (La. 1975); Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 257 La.
471, 242 So. 2d 821, 831 (1970).
124. Galloway v. State Dept. of Transp., 654 So. 2d 1345, 1347 (La. 1995) (citations omitted).
125. 1&.
126. 615 So. 2d 289, 293-93 (La. 1993): "The terminology 'negligence per se' has been rejected
in Louisiana. The violation of a statute or regulation does not automatically, in and of itself, impose
civil liability. Civil responsibility is imposed only If the act in violation of the statute is the legal
cause of damage to another." (citations omitted).
127. 360 So. 2d 1164, 1168-69 (La. 1978):
[W]e do not intend to revive the doctrine of "negligence per se." A violation of a
criminal statute does not automatically create liability in a particular civil case, because
the statute may have been designed to protect someone other than the plaintiff, or to
protect the plaintiff from some evil other than the injury for which recovery is sought....
In this sense, criminal statutes can be said to be mere guidelines for the court.... Yet,
where a criminal statute imposes a duty designed to protect a particular person from a
particular type of injury, one who has so injured such a person by a breach of the
prescribed duty cannot evade civil liability by persuading the court to disregard the clear
legislative prohibition as if it were a mere discretionary "guideline."
128. 273 So. 2d 30, 33 (La. 1973):
We granted this writ [because we) were apprehensive that the appellate court had held the
plaintiff contributorily negligent merely because of a finding of a. cause-in-fact and a
statutory violation without a determination of legal cause. We have rejected the concept
that a violation of a penal statute automatically constitutes negligence, and we have
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Co.' Close examination of each of these cases reveals that the court's rejection
of the "negligence per se" terminology was intended only to signal that a statutory
violation does not have tort consequences against a defendant unless the plaintiff's
class of persons and the general type of harm suffered were within the intended
ambit of protection of the statute.
But the standard version of the negligence per se doctrine in Anglo-
American law also insists that the plaintiff's class of persons and the general type
of harm suffered be within the statute's ambit of protection. Putting that thought
another way: under no version of the negligence per se doctrine does the
statutory violation count against the defendant unless the statute-violating conduct
was a legal cause of the harm in suit.'" 0 One does not need to reject the
concept of negligence per se to achieve that result; it comes with the territory.
From the foregoing point of view, rejecting the vocabulary of negligence per
se to achieve the imposition of a legal causation limit in statutory violation cases
is throwing out the baby with the bath. It might be said that Louisiana jurists
have occasionally thought that common-law negligence per se meant "negligence
with a capital N." But all the negligence per se doctrine has ever meant is
"negligence with a lower-case n," viz., breach. In functional effect, Louisiana
still has a standard version of the negligence per se doctrine. But by repeatedly
saying that it does not--that statutes are "guidelines" rather than rules-appellate
courts occasionally mislead counsel and lower courts, so that unfocused
presentation of cases at the trial level is sometimes fostered, and unnecessary
appeals ensue.
F. Repairmen
In Ladue v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., Judge Rubin asserted his "belie[f] that the
Louisiana Supreme Court would hold that (a] platform owner owed no duty
under [La. Civ. Code arts. 2317 and 2322] to an independent-contractor
repairman injured by the very condition he was hired to repair.""' Judge
Rubin thought that there should be a "rule of law (that] would encourage the
rejected the terminology "negligence per se."
129. 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714. 717 (1972):
We have repeatedly held that a criminal violation would lead to civil responsibility only
if that act is the legal cause of damage to another. To decide whether the violation of the
criminal statute by Laird imposes civil liability upon him.... we must determine whether
his act was a cause-in-fact of the accident, what was the nature of the duty imposed upon
him, what' risks were encompassed within that duty, and whether under the combination
of these considerations he should be declared negligent.
130. 1 would put both the class-of-persons and the type-of-harm inquiry under the legal cause
concept. I think the cases in supra notes 128 and 129 agree with this approach. Galligan, supra note
40, at 12, uses a slightly different analysis, whereby the class-of-persons issue falls under duty and
the type-of-harm issue under legal cause. Galligan's approach exemplifies Model Two, supra part
IT.C; mine exemplifies Model One, supra part I1I.B.
131. 920 F.2d 272, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1991).
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owner to repair the platform [by precluding liability] when repairmen are injured
by the very condition they are hired to repair."'32
In the recent case of Celestine v. Union Oil Co. of California, the supreme
court disagreed with Judge Rubin, holding that a "per se rule that an owner may
never be held strictly liable to a repairman injured while repairing the alleged defect
[would be] unworkable and contrary to the fact intensive nature of the definition of
'unreasonable risk.""" The repairman/plaintiff in Celestine nevertheless lost his
case because "he possessed the skills and knowledge of a specialized repairman
[and) knew the defect was present."" The tenor of the Celestine opin-
ion-which emphasizes "the fact that an injured person was a repairman hired to
fix the defect is a relevant factor in assessing whether the defect posed an
unreasonable risk of harm""'-is that repairmen are going to have a very hard
time proving that the defect they were hired to repair was an unreasonable risk
because repairmen should be able to look outfor themselves. A sampling of recent
repairman cases suggests that repairman-plaintiffs usually lose on that basis.136
In fact, I have found no recent case in which a repairman-plaintiff prevailed.'
If it should turn out to be true that repairman-plaintiffs are virtually invariably
defeated by the perception that their status and expertise prevents their proving the
unreasonable risk element, then it is arguable that we would be better off with a rule
of law so stating. If the law in operation actually precludes defective-condition
liability to repairmen, we might reasonably prefer to have the courts announce it so
that fruitless litigation by repairmen can be stopped at the beginning of the
lawsuit-or even earlier, when plaintiffs' lawyers begin to get the message-rather
than (as now seems so often to happen) at the very end.
G. Fault of the Victim as the Sole Legal Cause of the Injury
It continues to be debatable whether barring a victim's recovery on the basis
that her fault was the sole legal cause of her harm is consistent with a "pure"
comparative fault regime, 3 such as that mandated by Louisiana Civil Code
132. Id. at 277-78. Judge Rubin did not refer to it, but the maritime law's "primary duty"
doctrine would have provided a rough analogy to a "repairman exception." See Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 4-24 (2d ed. 1994).
133. 652 So. 2d 1299. 1304 (La. 1995).
134. Id. at 1305.
135. Id
136. See Genusa v. B & B Sheet Metal, 663 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995), writ denied,
666 So. 2d 672 (1996); Touchet v. Estate of Bass, 653 So. 2d 83 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 654
So. 2d 1112 (1995); Desormeaux v. Audubon Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ
denied, 613 So. 2d 1002 (1993); Triplette v. Exxon Corp., 554 So. 2d 1361 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989);
Eldridge v. Bonanza Family Restaurant, 542 So. 2d 1146 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
137. The repairman-plaintiff succeeded In getting past the summary judgment stage in Carter v.
Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
138. "Pure" comparative fault means that victim fault even as great as 99.99% will yield a
recovery of some damages provided the prima facie case against the defendant is made. It is
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article 2323139 and by the general maritime law.1"' Those who argue that the
"victim-as-sole-legal-cause" approach is illicit maintain that it reintroduces the
discredited contributory negligence doctrine into the law by the back door
(making it even harsher by forcing the plaintiff to negate her fault whereas the
old contributory negligence doctrine put the burden on the defendant). 141
Those who favor the "sole cause" approach argue that judicial authority to
invoke it flows from the premises and conceptual structure of the duty/risk
analysis."4 2
The Louisiana case law has not settled this debate. Nor has the matter been
put to rest at the national level. A few years ago the "sole cause" technique
irresistibly tempted the Louisiana Third Circuit in Shafer v. State, in which a
highway defect that the court said would have been actionable on behalf of most
motorists imposed no liability to a motorist who, as a former highway construc-
tion worker, should have known about and been able to guard against the
defect. 3  The "sole cause" technique also captivated the United States
Supreme Court in the recent maritime case, Exxon Company, U.S.A. v. Sofec,
Inc., in which those responsible for a faulty mooring system escaped liability
despite their own (arguendo) conceded culpability because of the perceived
extraordinary negligence of the master of the plaintiff vessel that ran aground as
a result of the mooring's failure.' 44
Neither the Louisiana Third Circuit decision nor the United States Supreme
Court decision contains any focused discussion of the tension between the pure
comparative fault rule-which says that even a 99%-at-fault victim should
recover 1% of his damages-and the "sole legal cause rule"-which says that
sometimes the plaintiff's negligence can be so extraordinary or grotesque (despite
being less than 100%) that it will defeat recovery. The technique in question
thus persists as an occasional and not-fully-articulated exception to the general
principle of pure comparative fault regimes whereby victim fault cannot itself bar
recovery.
contrasted with "modified" comparative fault whereby victim fault above a certain level-usually
49% or 50%--cuts off the plaintiff's right to recover. See Robertson, supra note 40, at 362-64.
139. La. Civ. Code art. 2323. See Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.. 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
140. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde. 511 U.S. 202. 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994); United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975).
141. See, e.g., David W. Robertson, The Louisiana Law of Comparative Fault: A Decade of
Progress 21-28 (LSU Law Center 1991); David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault,
Duty.Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability
litigation in Louisiana, 44 La. L. Rev. 1341 (1984).
142. See H. Alston Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 La. L. Rev.
319 (1980).
143. 590 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
144. 116 S. Ct. 1813 (1996). The word "arguendo" in the text is necessary because the Sofec
plaintiff never got to try the issue of the defendant's fault. The trial judge bifurcated the trial in such
a way that the Issue of victim fault was tried to the bench first, preceding and in isolation from all
of the other potential issues in the case. This unusual trial methodology was upheld by the Ninth
Circuit and by the Supreme Court.
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE PIT AND THE PENDULUM
Tort law is always in motion. It is the legal system's response to miscella-
neous mishaps caused by life on earth and is bound to shift with changes in
local, national, and global societies and the relations among them. For most
first-year law students, this quintessential malleability makes torts both the most
fascinating and the most frustrating subject in the curriculum. As a teacher of
beginning law students, I have come to believe that fascination can be maxi-
mized, frustration minimized, and focus and analytical powers sharpened by
placing myself and the students firmly in the best vantage point for talking and
thinking about Anglo-American tort law: that of a trial judge sitting with a jury.
I try to insist that all of our discussions proceed from that vantage point unless
a self-conscious change of perspective has been announced and defended.
In making that choice of pedagogical perspective, I have consciously and
with great trepidation chosen a vantage point that is different from the habitual
stance of two of my greatest heroes. In the world of torts scholarship, there are
many whose insight and industry I have come to admire, and there are three
giants in the front row: Wex Malone, Leon Green, and Page Keeton. Keeton's
torts work was of a lawyerly and pragmatic nature, suitable for sorting out tough
practical problems and an excellent model for the (hoped-for) long haul of life
as a result-oriented and clarity-seeking student, teacher, and practitioner. Malone
and Green were also excellent lawyers, but for the most part their scholarship
was at a higher level of abstraction than Keeton's.
I have often tried to identify the perspective or vantage point from which
Malone and Green made their wise and penetrating observations about torts
problems. With diffidence, I believe that Dean Green habitually spoke from a
level approximately horizontal with that of God. He felt that he saw farther and
more clearly than most other earthly beings, and that most people could be
persuaded to see things his way if he could just get them alone and sweep the
cobwebs from their eyes. From that perspective, Green found burning reasons
to care about the old demon of "proximate cause"-which for him was an
undefined bit of "legal theology" (his favorite pejorative term) or word magic
whereby unprincipled limitation-of-liability decisions could be achieved at will
or whim by untrammeled judges. But for some reason Dean Green did not seem
to care very much about whether duty issues were phrased generally, or whether
they were phrased in such a way as to absorb much of the traditional breach
issue (as in Model Six above). Green had inconsistent things to say about that
judicial technique. At times he seemed to approve it, 45 at times to condemn
it,'46 and at times to be unconcerned.' 7
145. See Green, supra note 5, at 59-60.
146. See id. at 30-31, 57, 184-85.
147. See id at 26-27. 29-30, 57.
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Professor Malone's habitual perspective was not quite so lofty. I believe he
looked at the torts process through the imagined eyes of a supreme court justice.
From that vantage point, Malone strove mightily for wise and humane principles
of law. He was seemingly unconcerned with whether such principles would
allow cases to be resolved at the trial stage or would instead frequently call for
resolution at the highest judicial levels.' He discussed specific decisions from
the standpoint of the deciding appellate justices, paying little or no attention to
the input that the lawyers and trial judges may have had in the matter." 9 From
his high-court vantage point, Malone had no problem with judges' making duty
formulations ever more specific and fact-intrusive, thereby absorbing what others
would have preferred to be treated as legal cause and breach matters and hence
grist for the fact-oriented mill of the trial court. °so Malone's eye was on the
output of the entire legal system, which for him meant the substantive product
emanating from the top of the structure. He was not much worried about any
putative need for clear rules-rules that might avoid some ultimately doomed
lawsuits--or about avoiding appeals.' 51
From the trial judge's vantage point, it is much easier to be worried about
discouraging ultimately doomed lawsuits and about avoiding appeals. Heuristi-
cally speaking, the trial judge's seat is the best in the house. Here is where the
rubber meets the road, where the fray hits the fan, where the law of the case first
gets made, where the real roll-up-your-sleeves work gets done. The situation of
the trial judge elicits ready empathy with the parties; with the-lawyers who must
advise clients as to whether to proceed (or vigorously defend) and then determine
how to try the case; with the jurors who must ultimately make the tough factual
calls; and with the appellate judges who may be called upon to review the trial
court's product. Everything immediately.relevant is in sight. All of the other
participants' practical and theoretical concerns are relevant and graspable.
In this section of the paper I am conceptualizing the trial judge's situation
as the pit, somewhat in the sense of shop floor. My dictionary gives twelve
meanings for the noun "pit."' 5 Eight of them are useful here:
(1) The section directly in front of the stage of a theater, in which the
musicians sit.
148. See Wex S. Malone and Leah Guerry. Studies in Louisiana Torts Law 238. 296. 302. 462.
465. 632-33, 646-47 (1970) [hereinafter Studies]; Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It
Yourse(f Versus American Beverage Company, 30 La. L. Rev. 363, 369, 377, 378-79, 380, 382, 383
(1970) [hereinafter Ruminations].
149. See Malone, Studies, supra note 148, at 401, 423, 476, 632-33. 646-47, 663-68.
150. See id at 268, 269, 418. 422, 479, 686; Malone, Ruminations, supra note 148, at 387-88.
But cf. Malone, Studies, supra note 148, at 423, 427, 646, 685.
151. See, e.g., Malone, Studies, supra note 148, at 802 (an excerpt from the annual torts survey
at 25 La. L. Rev. 49 (1964), in which Professor Malone criticized as having been wholly unnecessary
legislation protecting "good samaritans" from liability. Malone argued that such actors always
escaped liability In litigation against them in any event. He gave no weight to the evident desirability
of avoiding suits against physicians and others who voluntarily administer emergency aid).
152. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 998 (1981).
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(2) , The section of an exchange where trading in a specific commodity
is carried on.
(3) An enclosed space, often one dug in the ground, in which animals,
such as dogs or gamecocks, are placed for fighting.
.(4) A relatively deep hole in the ground, either natural, as a pothole or
sinkhole, or man-made, as a mine shaft.
(5) A trap consisting of a concealed hole in the ground; pitfall.
(6) Any hidden danger or unexpected trouble.
(7) An abysmal or despairing condition.
(8) Hell.
For those of us who are not trial judges, pondering these definitions at the
appropriate length may help to engender the proper mixture of awe, respect, fear,
and pity.
The pendulum conceptualized in this section is the magisterial movement of
appellate-authored tort law. Here is how Leon Green (in full God-like mode)
pictured that movement:
Our goals [are] peace, happiness, health, justice, economic welfare, law
and order here on earth and in heaven hereafter. [But] our more
practiced and negative virtues [are] war, power, greed, deceit, waste,
riotous living, sex, hate and death. This does not mean that there will
be breeds of full-fledged saints and dedicated sinners at one another's
throats, but that everyone will take turns as saint and sinner at many
points in time. Creation and destruction will continue to go hand in
hand as they have done from the beginning, and thus the schizophrenic
balance of love and fury will be maintained." 3
From a more mundane perspective, tort law's pendulum movement results from
the eternal and irreconcilable tension between the quest for certainty or control
and the essential need for flexibility.
Over the past several decades the appellate judiciary in Louisiana has
seemed to move the law toward flexibility and away from the achievement of
control by jettisoning, disparaging, or resisting the adoption of such rules as the
trespasser-licensee-invitee structure of land occupier liability law,'5 the assured
clear distance rule of traffic liability law,' 55 the repairman exception,'56 and
153. Robertson, supra note 96, at 437 (quoting and blending Green's articles, Must the Litigation
Profession Undergo a Spiritual Rebirth?, 16 Ind. LJ. 15, 28 (1940). and No-Fault: A Perspective,
1975 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 79, 80).
154. See supra note 60.
155. Ledbetter v. State, 502 So.. 2d 1383, 1387 n.5 (La. 1987) ("the doctrine of assured clear
distance has been rejected by this court in Craker v. Allstate Insurance Co., 259 La. 578, 250 So.2d
746 (1971)").
156. See supra part V.P.
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the doctrine of negligence per se.' At the same time the appellate judiciary
has moved toward a different kind of control by selectively absorbing the legal
cause and breach issues into the duty issue,'58 by occasionally applying the
judicial legislator approach to the determination of breach,5 9 and by treating
breach determinations for appellate review purposes as though they were
determinations of law."
Viewed from the trial-court pit, there is tension or even a paradoxical
relationship between the two movements: one movement seems to favor
flexibility; the other, control. But stepping briefly from the pit and over to the
viewing point of student of government, one sees the paradox disappear and the
tension seem to resolve: both movements serve the perhaps inexorable ' flow
of authority from trial to appellate court. Lawyers in their offices and trial
judges in the pit can identify, validate, and apply clear rules with confidence
against undue second-guessing. But it usually seems to take an appellate court
to put the finishing touches on a flexible or general principle. From this point
of view, the plea of this article might be summarized: give the advantages of the
view from the pit their full due; only then may the schizophrenic balance of trial-
court and appellate authority be maintained.
157. See supra part V.E.
158. See supra parts III.D and 11I.G.
159. See supra part M.F.
160. See supra part V.B.
161. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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